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ZERO COCA, ZERO CULTURE: BOLIVIA'S STRUGGLE TO
BALANCE CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC
STABILITY IN THE MIDST OF THE EXPIRING ANDEAN TRADE
PROMOTION AND DRUG ERADICATION ACT
CameronMing*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The Saudis can fight alcoholism by forbidding the sale of Jack Daniels, but
we'd think they were crazy if they ordered us to eradicate fields of barley in
Tennessee."'
-John

Tierney, a journalist, regarding the eradication of coca in Bolivia.

From adobe hut to presidential mansion, Evo Morales is a man of the
people. 2 Bred3 on Bolivia's harsh altiplano rather than among the country's
economic elite, Morales assumed the office of president in a historic victory for

J.D. candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, OK, May 2008;
B.A., English,
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, Aug. 2003. A special thanks to Austin and Greg for all of
your guidance and persistence. Most importantly, I am eternally indebted to Kressyda and Eliot
for being the light at the end of this long tunnel.
1. John Tierney, Reading the Coca Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2006, at A11.
2. See Jennifer Brea, Evo Morales,Presidentof Bolivia, About.com,
http://worldnews.about.com/od/whoswhoinworldaffairs/p/evomorales.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2007).
3. Evo Morales Aima - Childhood,
http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfilEng-infan.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Childhood].
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democracy. 4 An anomaly among politicians, Morales is described as an
incorruptible, honest official who promotes popular causes. 5 But despite all of
his alleged good characteristics, one item has become an international stumbling
block for Morales: his fervent dedication to the coca leaf.6
It is difficult to understand how the coca leaf, believed to be a gift from the
gods, 7 could be the source of human rights violations 8 and a billion dollar illegal
drug industry. 9 Yet coca has been a cause of contention for decades. And with
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act ("ATPDEA") set to
expire on June 30, 2007,10 the leaf may soon be linked to the "erosion of
democracy" in Bolivia. 1 1
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in South America, despite having
the second largest natural gas reserves on the continent. Nearly two-thirds of the
nation's population live in squalor. 13 In times of financial trouble, Bolivia has
4. Waltraud Queiser Morales, Responding to Bolivian Democracy: Avoiding the Mistakes of
Early U.S.
Cuban
Policy, MIL. REv.,
July-Aug.
2006,
at
27,
available at
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAugO6/Morales.pdf ("The election
of Evo Morales as president of Bolivia is perhaps the strongest evidence to date that countries on
the Andean Ridge are achieving that often-stated policy goal. By all accounts, Morales's election
gave him the first true public mandate in Bolivia's history.") [hereinafter Responding to Bolivian
Democracy].
5. Steve Boggan, 'Coca is a Way of Life', GUARDIAN,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,,1705685,00.html;
Democracy, supra note 4, at 32.

Feb. 9, 2006, available at
Responding to
Bolivian

6. Boggan, supra note 5.
7. Solimar Santos, Comment, Unintended Consequences of United States' Foreign Drug
Policy in Bolivia, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 127, 131 (2002).
8. See Sam Logan, Bolivia Has the Right To Grow Coca, International Relations & Securities
Network, Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16539.
9. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse:Fact
Sheet, Mar. 2003, at 2, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pdf/drug-datasum.pdf.
10. ATPA Extension, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 7002(a) (2006) ("Section 208 of the Andean
Trade Preference Act (19 U.S.C. 3206) is amended by striking 'December 31, 2006' and inserting
'June 30, 2007'.").
11. Hal Weitzman, Rhetoric collides with Bolivia trade hope, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d6d3e98e-3854-1 ldb-ae2c-0000779e2340.html.
12. Connie Veillette, Bolivia: Political and Economic Developments and Relations with the
United
States, CRS
REPORT FOR
CONGRESS,
June
22,
2005,
available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32580.pdf.
13. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Bolivia, Mar. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm [hereinafter Profile]; Julie McCarthy, A Bolivian
Populist
Upends
the
Status
Quo,
Sept.
15,
2006,
NPR,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=6061781 ("At least 60 percent of Bolivia's
population lives on $2 or less a day, and the gap between rich and poor is one of the widest in the
world."); Habitat for Humanity Bolivia, http://www.habitat.org/intllac/24.aspx (last visited Apr.
30, 2007) ("Bolivia has a population of 8 million people, 3.6 million of which do not have access
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turned to its centuries old friend, the coca leaf, to help alleviate economic
pains.14 In 1985, economic adjustments caused many to rely on the production
of the coca leaf which stimulated the overall national economy.' 5 However,
coca is also the main ingredient in cocaine.16 Bolivia's economic dependence on
coca has caused the United States to place a greater interest in expanding
economic development in Bolivia, aloTg with its cocaine-producing
With the ultimate goal to wean
counterparts-Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru.
them off of coca, the United States passed the Andean Trade Preferences Act
("ATPA") in 1991.18 That act made way for the renamed Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act ("ATPDEA") in 2002,19 which permits an
abundance of goods to enter the United States with no importation tariffs, in
hopes that the economy will grow in other areas.20
The ATPDEA expired on Dec. 31, 2006, but was shortly extended to June
30, 2007. 2 1 The language of the temporary extension provides for a further
conditional extension of six months if the benefiting country implements a
sufficient trade agreement. 2 2 Peru and Columbia have already negotiated new
bilateral trade agreements with the United States while during the proceedings

to potable water and sewage services.... Statistics also show that out of the total population, 58
percent of Bolivian families live in huts that do not meet the minimum living conditions, lacking
basic services and sanitation. Thirty-two percent of homes accommodate three or more people per
UNICEF,
in
Bolivia,
of
Children
The
Situation
bedroom.");
http://www.unicef.org/bolivia/children_1540.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2007) ("Children and
women are the groups most affected by high national levels of poverty. According to the 2002
Poverty Map, 2.5 million children and 2.6 million women live in conditions of poverty. The causes
of mortality in children aged under 5, according to the Ministry of Health, are directly associated
with poverty. Also, 36 per cent of these deaths occur owing to diarrhoeal diseases, 20 per

cent owing to acute respiratory infections, 16 per cent owing to perinatal problems (related to
childbirth) and an estimated 28 per cent owing to malnutrition.").
14. See generally Kathryn Ledebur, Coca and Conflict in the Chapare, WOLA DRUG WAR
MONITOR, July 2002, availableat http://www.wola.org/medialddhr-bolivia-brief.pdf.

15. Id.
16. E.g., Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Jack of All Plants, LEGAL AFFAIRS, March I April 2006, at 12,
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2006/scenePhelan-maraprO6.msp.
17. Veillette, supra note 12.

18.

SECOND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT

AS AMENDED 1 (Apr. 30, 2005), availableat

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Development/Preference-Programs/ATPA/asset-upload-file337
_7673.pdf [hereinafter SECOND REPORT].
19. Id.
20. Bolivia and the Andean Trade Program, http:/lapaz.usembassy.gov/atpdea/atpaeng.htm
[hereinafter Andean Trade Program].
21. ATPA Extension, surpa note 10, § 7002(a)-(b).
22. Id. § 7002(b)(l)-(2).
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Bolivia maintained its status as an "observer." 23 Excluding Bolivia from an
agreement would essentially loose the third largest producer of cocaine from any
eradication efforts. 24 With strong ties and new trade agreements with Cuba and
Venezuela, Bolivia may be looking to sever its dependency on the United
25

States.

The amount of coca cultivation decreased for the first time in 2005 after a
steady upward trend in the last five years. 26 Morales has expressed his
commitment to reducing poverty and to sustaining alternative economic
development. 2 7 Continuing the reduction of coca can go hand in hand with
reducing poverty if a long-term, viable alternative to coca cultivation is available
to farmers. 28 This is the very purpose
of the ATPDEA-to provide a sustainable
29
cultivation.
coca
to
option
economic
The purpose of this comment is to show the impact the ATPDEA has had
on Bolivia-both economically and in providing an alternative to the drug
trade-and to explain the need for forming a trade agreement extending
ATPDEA benefits while re-examining the strict policies on coca eradication.
Section II explores the economic and cultural importance of the coca leaf to
Bolivia, while section m examines the differences between the original ATPA
and the expanded ATPDEA and the economic effects stemming from the
change. Section IV discusses the development of President Evo Morales and the
duplicitous stance that Bolivia has taken regarding the United States. The
possible effects of an expired ATPDEA, as well as the key to an effective change
are discussed in section V.
Critical rhetoric and antagonistic trade agreements have distanced Morales
from the United States and any new trade agreement, but Morales still courts the
U.S. for continued benefits despite the growing political rift. However, the U.S.
might not be willing to withdraw support from Bolivia for its own interests, in
23. Weitzman,

supra

note

11;

http://www.comunidadandia.org/ingles/Exterior/usa.htm

Common

Foreign

Policy,

(last visited Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter

Common Foreign Policy] ("Spurred by the need to have stable and predictable trading relations
with the United States once the period of effectiveness of the ATPDEA expires, Columbia,
Ecuador y [sic] Peru have been negotiating a free trade agreement with that country since May
2004, in order to promote more trade and investment.... It should be added here that Bolivia has
been participating as an observer in those negotiations.").
24. Weitzman, supra note 11.
25. Anita Snow, Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela Reject US Trade, Bilaterals.org, Apr. 29, 2006,
availableat http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=4596.
26. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COCA CULTIVATION SURVEY, June 2006, at
1 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Bolivia-coca-survey-2005_eng.pdf
[hereinafter UNODC 2006].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.
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addition to Bolivia's. Although Bolivia is largely dependent on the United
States for economic growth, it has received support and influence from countries
which are diplomatically at odds with the United States. To avoid the erosion of
democracy and the stifling of a budding economy, the United States must
reexamine its emphasis on coca reduction while still maintaining trade benefits.
H. UNDERSTANDING COCA

Coca is primarily grown in three areas of Bolivia: the Yungas of La Paz, the
Chapare of Cochabamba, and the Apolo region of northern La Paz.
Most of
these areas consist of rural farmers that rely on coca because of a lack of other
viable economic alternatives. 3 1 When these farmers are confronted by anti-drug
advocates, farmers argue that they have the right to grow coca for two reasons:
(1) the deep-seated tradition of coca in the Bolivian culture,
and (2) the
32
region.
the
in
become
has
leaf
the
that
cornerstone
economic
A. Coca Culture
Unlike other coca-producing countries, like Columbia, the coca leaf is
rooted deep in the history and tradition of Bolivia. 33 According to legend, the
promiscuous goddess of health and happiness, Cocomama, was cut in half by her
jealous lovers. 34 From her severed ends grew the first coca plants. 35 Others

considered the leaf a gift from the Sun god, believing that coca is a "sacred
symbol of the mother earth. ' 36 Ancient Incan Kings chewed the sacred leaf and
the practice began to spread. 37 For indigenous groups, coca still plays an
integral role in religious and cultural ceremonies. 38 Each day as workers enter
mines they present an offering of coca and alcohol to the god of the underworld,

30. UNODC 2006, supra note 26, at 13 (showing the percentage of coca grown by region: the
Yungas produced 71% of the total, the Chapare produced 28%, and the Apolo produced 1%.);
Daniel Tyler Cook, The Casefor Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia's March to Economic Freedom, 13
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 57, 60 (2004).
31. Melanie R. Hallums, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug Control, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSAT'L L. 817, 826 (1997); Cook, supra note 30, at 60.
32. Cook, supra note 30, at 60.
33. Boggan, supra note 5.
34. Micha Lindemans,
Cocomama, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA,
July
20,
1999,
http://www.pantheon.org/articles/c/cocamama.html.
35. Id.
36. Santos, supra note 7, at 131.
37. Hallums, supra note 31, at 822.
38. Santos, supra note 7, at 131.
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El Tio (the devil), to ensure the mine is safe and productive that day. 39 The leaf
is exchanged in wedding ceremonies, and during a wake the coca is chewed
while mourning for the dead. 4 1 Much more than a plant, coca "functions as an
index of cultural identity, and serves as a medium of communication between
humans and supernatural beings." 42
Its link to the spiritual realm spills over into a number of daily roles.43 One
promoter of the leaf states, "If you can't sleep because of indigestion or bad
circulation or anxiety, drink a cup of coca tea and you will sleep... But if you
need to do hard work or study, chew 20 or 25 coca leaves and you will work all
night.",4 4 In rural areas, workers carry pouches with coca leaves 45 because on the
altiplano, where altitudes can reach 4,200 meters 46 (13,779 feet) and survival
requires grueling labor, the coca's ability to alleviate fatigue, pain, and
symptoms of high altitude sickness is invaluable.4 7 The leaf is also known for its
ability to suppress
In social49 situations, the art of chewing is
....hunger and thirst.
a skill that is practiced, eslecially after meals.
Coca has even made its way
into the world of products.
Items ranging from weight-loss tonic to chewing
gum to shampoo now rely on coca as an ingredient. 5 1 The plant contains vitamin
A, calcium, vitamin C, and several other pharmacologically useful chemical
substances 5 2 which are important given the poor diet generally available to the
Bolivian peasants. 53 There are also products to treat medicinal problems
including tuberculosis, cancer, and even cocaine addiction. 54 These examples
illustrate why coca has been called "the world's most complete plant" 5 5 and why

39. Melissa Giovanni, Potosi Potosi Potosi! Vamos a Potosi!,
http://www2.ess.ucla.edu/-bolivia/potosi.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
40. HARRY SANABRIA, THE COCA BOOM & RURAL SOCIAL CHANGE IN BOLIVIA 38 (1993).
41. Ralph Bolton, On Coca Chewing and High-Altitude Stress, CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, 41820 (June 1979).
42. SANABRIA, supra note 40, at 38; Cook, supra note 30, at 61.
43. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16.
44. Id.
45. Hallums, supra note 31, at 824.
46. Profile, supra note 13.
47. Cook. supra note 30, at 61.
48. Hallums, supra note 31, at 826.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. SANABRIA, supra note 40, at 38.

54. Id.
55. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16, at 12.
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some Bolivians have called for an56amendment to enshrine the sacred status of the
coca in the Bolivian constitution.
B. Coca Economy
Bolivia, the poorest country in South America,57 maintains an annual per
capita income of only $940. 5 8 Nearly two thirds of the population engages in
agriculture, yet it only accounts for 14.5% of the gross national product. 59 Coca
is vital to the economy because of its major contribution. Before strong
eradication measures were implemented, nearly 60,000 farmers grew coca, while
thousands more participated in the other aspects of production such as
It is estimated6 1that the eradication of
transporting, selling, and distributing.
$500 million.
nearly
economy
Bolivian
the
coca has cost
of other
of the failure
The coca plant dominates the industry because
62 Tecc'
ucs
oe
success
comes
The
coca's
provide
income.
possible cash crops to successfully
from a variety of factors. First, Bolivia has the unique environment required for
coca to thrive. 63 Second, the coca plant can survive the extreme conditions of
the Bolivian Chapare
••region while other crops do not.6 Coca is less
• predisposed
65
Finally,
to insects and disease than other cash crops such as coffee and rice.
66
For
coca
plant.
as
the
on
the
market
other crops fail to perform as successfully
example, bananas and grapefruit typically bring in $35 to $250 a year, if growers
are even able to find a market. 67 On the other hand, one source states that an
acre of coca may produce $475, 6 8 while another calculates that an acre could
provide as much as $2,921 a year, under ideal growing conditions. 69 In a land

56. Marcelo Ballv6, "Mother Coca" Wins in Bolivia, Can Evo Morales Foster World Coca
Market?, New America Media, Dec. 21, 2005, available at
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.html?article-id=99b24b3ff23a2b 1i5a2802b7
bf85117f.
57. Hallums, supra note 31, at 822.
58. Profile, supra note 13.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
$7,215

Id.
Cook, supra note 30, at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 62.
Id.
SANABRIA, supra note 40, at 44; Cook, supra note 30, at 62.
Cook, supra note 30, at 61.
Hallums, supra note 31, at 822.
Id.
SANABRIA, supra note 40, at 46 (Under ideal growing conditions, one hectare could yield
worth of coca.).
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where two-thirds of the population lives in poverty, 70 survival generally dictates
growing what produces the highest return. The farmers turn to coca because it
keeps them from falling further into poverty.7 1 Without asking questions about
the coca's final destination,72 they rely on the income for their very survival. 73 It
is now estimated that74 one-third of the population relies on the coca industry,
directly or indirectly.
Aside from the plant's hardiness and value on the market, other economic
factors explain the increase in export-oriented coca production. 75 From the time
of Spanish Colonialism, minerals were at the center of Bolivia's exports. 76 A
decline in prices for tin and natural gas during the 1980s spurred a drop in the
highland economy, resulting in high unemployment in those regions. 77 Migrant
workers made their way to the Chapare region where the coca industry offered
jobs and security. 78 Coca, a labor-intensive crop, absorbed the arrival of migrant
labor.7 9 Although the Chapare offered the perfect climate, it was illegal to
grow coca there, 81 but with the influx of workers, the illegal coca trade soon
surpassed
,,82 the licit coca market, "launching Bolivia into the international drug
trade.
Because of the continuing levels of poverty and meager
economic
83
farmers.
rural
among
thrived
trade
coca
the
opportunities elsewhere,
Bolivian Law 1008, which deals with
of coca, caps the legal
84• the cultivation •85
84
amount of coca at 12,000 hectares.
Located primarily in the Yungas region

70. Profile, supra note 13.
71. Cook, supra note 30, at 63.
72. Boggan, supra note 5 ("Asked how [a coca farmer] would feel if the buyer of his crop
channeled it into illegal cocaine production, he replies: 'I wouldn't know anything about that."').
73. Id. ("'[Income from selling coca] means everything to us,' says Ramos [a coca farmer]. 'I
have two children and, for me, it means we have food, I can pay for my children's education and
bring them up properly."').
74. Id.
75. Hallums, supra note 31, at 825.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 826.

78. Id.
79. SANABRIA, supra note 40, at 47 ("Coca cultivation requires over three times as much labor
as other labor intensive lowland crops such as coffee and rice ....
80. Cook, supra note 30, at 62.
81. Hallums, supra note 31, at 827.
82. Id. at 826.
83. Id.; Boggan, supra note 5 ("Morales flatly refuses to admit it, but without narco-trafficking,
large sections of his community would simply starve.").
84. Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controlada [Coca and Controlled Substances
Law], Ley N' 1008 de 19 de Julio de 1988, Articulo 29' [hereinafter Ley 1008] ("la cantidad de
coca necesaria para cubrir la demanda del consume tradicional ... la misma que no podrd exceder
]a producci6n equivalente a un drea de 12.000 hectdreas de cultivo de coca ....).
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of La Paz, this coca is used for traditional and other legal uses. In 2004, the
Bolivian government temporarily permitted 3,200 hectares of coca to be grown
in the Chapare region, 86 but much more is grown in reality. 87 The United States
estimates that 5,000 hectares of coca would fulfill the need for traditional
Bolivia. 89
usage. 88 In 2004, 27,700 hectares of coca were cultivated throughout
Of the estimated 90 49,000 metric tons of coca produced it is estimated that
38,000 metric tons were available for cocaine production. 9 1 The amount
decreased in 2005 to 25,400 hectares, 9 2 equaling an estimated 42,000 metric
tons, but still left a significant surplus of 30,900 metric tons available for
93
cocaine.

85. UNODC 2006, supra note 26, at 15 ("The Yungas of La Paz, situated at about 150 km from
the city of La Paz, is a region of uneven relief with steep slopes, turbulent rivers and elevations
ranging from 300 to 4,000 meters above sea level. Significant climatic variations are observed
even over short distances. Coca bush is predominantly cultivated on narrow terraces built on high
gradient hills.").
86. Id. at 27 ("The Chapare region is situated in Cochabamba department, and the region is also
referred to as the Cochabamba tropics, extending over the provinces of Chapare, Carrasco and
Tiraque. In contrast to the Yungas of La Paz, Chapare region has moderate slopes and large rivers.
Elevations vary from 300 to 2500 meters, with coca cultivated between 300 and 1000 meters. The
highest mountains are located in the south and the country's large tropical savannas begin in the
northern part of Chapare. Temperatures are tropical and the area records the highest precipitation
levels in Bolivia.").
87. See id.
88. Boggan, supra note 5.
89. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Bolivia, COCA CULTIVATION SURVEY, June
2005, at 5, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part2_Bolivia.pdf [hereinafter UNODC
2005]; Boggan, supra note 5.
90. UNODC, supra note 89, at 34 (explaining why the numbers at this time are only estimates)
("In July 2004, UNODC started its first study of coca leaf yield in Bolivia.... However, farmers
were often reluctant to cooperate with the study and the tense situation prevailing in the coca
growing areas of Bolivia in 2004 did not permit to complete all the activities.... For the 2004
annual estimate of coca leaf and cocaine production, UNODC relied on information available from
other sources.").
91. Id.; Boggan, supra note 5 (providing coca cultivation statistics that differ slightly from the
UNODC report in 2005) ("The UN says 36,300 tonnes of coca leaf was produced in 2004 - of
which it estimated that 25,000 tonnes was available for cocaine production. It takes between 300
and 500kg of coca leaf to make lkg of cocaine.").
92. UNODC 2006, supra note 26, at 9.
Coca Cultivation in Bolivia 1995-2005 (ha)
Rounded
Total

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

45,800

38,000

21,800

14,600

19,900

21,600

23,600

27,700

25,400

93. Id. at 35

384
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C. Coca versus Cocaine
The coca plant is the most indispensable crop to Bolivia's culture and
economy. 9 4 The "sacred leaf' 95 is intertwined in both the spiritual and temporal
worlds of the people. Perhaps it is for this reason that Bolivians are up in arms
that the governments of Bolivia and the United States have failed to make a
distinction between coca and cocaine. 96 This type of flawed logic is analogous
to equating barley to whiskey, or grapes to wine. 97 Defeating this mentality is
the goal of many Bolivians9 8 who wish to make "people see the true face of
coca," instead of the "dangerous substance," as some laws have classified the
leaf.99 One coca supporter explains that "[a]t the time of the Inca, coca was on
the highest altars ....Now, the drug'l ° traffickers take it and stomp it on the
ground and destroy it with chemicals."
Coca and cocaine are mutually exclusive. Cocaine comes as the result of an
extensive process and by the end the material is so completely different from its
original state it is folly to believe they should be grouped similarly. 101 Coca is
transformed to cocaine in three stages. 102 The first stage begins by mixing coca
leaves with sulfuric acid. 10 3 The leaves are then stomped, mixed with kerosene,
calcium oxide, diesel fuel, and sodium carbonate until there is a paste. ° 4 The
second stage is performed to purify the final product, but is optional. 10 5 The
paste is "washed in kerosene, dissolved in sulfuric acid, and mixed with
10 6
potassium permanganate and ammonium hydroxide to form cocaine base."
The final stage dissolves the cocaine paste in acetone and water. 107 It is then
heated, mixed with ether, then added to hydrochloric acid to form the cocaine
crystals. 108 The conversion process leaves the final product of cocaine
substantially different from the original coca leaf, 109 but this fact has failed to
prevent the two from facing a similar fate.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Cook, supra note 30, at 57.
Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 15, at 13.
Logan, supra note 8.
Cook, supra note 30, at 59.
Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Cook, supra note 30, at 60.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cook, supra note 30, at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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III. ATPA/ATPDEA

A. Preceding Measures
Initial attacks on the coca leaf came with the 1961 U.N. Convention on
Narcotics, 110 when the leaf was categorized as a drug along side cocaine." 1 The
Convention also designated cultivation of coca as "trafficking,'
and
harvesting of the plant was labeled "production." 113 In the 1980s, the use of
cocaine in its various forms was out of control in the United States. Seeking to
extinguish the flame at the source as part of the broader War on Drugs, the
United States turned its attention to controlling the growth of the coca plant. The
U.S. admits to heavily funding alternate development programs and policing
efforts in Bolivia. 114 The most significant law concerning eradication, the Coca
and Controlled Substance Law, Ley 1008, was forged with influence
from the
115
United States Agency for International Development ("USAID").
Relatively speaking, Ley 1008 was a breakthrough in comparison to
previous measures because it recognized the difference between cocaine and the
coca leaf. 116 Ley 1008 distinguished licit uses, such as chewing for medicinal
purposes, from its role in the production of cocaine. 117 The law stated that coca
grown in the Chapare region was not necessary to meet the demand of the
traditional uses, and called for its gradual eradication. 118 To implement Ley
1008 and curtail the economic conditions that perpetuate excessive coca
cultivation, assistance by foreign aid was inevitable.
To accomplish the goal

110. Hallums, supra note 31, at 828.
111. Id.; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S.
151, Schedule 1, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf [hereinafter
Drug Convention].
112. Drug Convention, supra note 111, art. 1(1)(1) ("'Illicit traffic' means cultivation or
trafficking in drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention."); Hallums, supra note 31, at

828.
113. Drug Convention, supra note 111, art. l(1)(t) ("'Production' means the separation of
opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained.");
Hallums, supra note 31, at 828.
114. Profile, supra note 13.
115. David E. Dubberly, Commentary on the Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias
Controlada, 6 INTER-AM LEGAL MATERIALS 278, 280, available at

http://www.natlaw.com/interam/bo/cs/sp/spbocs 1.htm; Hallums, supra note 31, at 830.
116. Ley 1008, supra note 84, Articulo 30 ("Para efectos legales se establece una diferencia entre
la coca en estado natural ... y coca 'Iter criminis'.....
117. Id. Articulo 4'.
118. Id. Articulo 100; Profile, supra note 13.

119. Hallums, supra note 31, at 831 ("While the law aims at annual targets of eradication of coca
hectares, it requires international development assistance to realize these goals. The law therefore
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of eradicating all "excess" coca, the Bolivian government incorporated programs
offering monetary compensation to farmers for voluntary destruction of their
coca plants.120 In some cases compensation reached $2,000 to $2,500 for each
hectare destroyed. 12 1 In addition to economic benefits, the government began
promoting alternate crops to substitute for the illicit coca. 122
In 1998, President Hugo Banzer launched Plan Dignidad (Dignity Plan).' 23
The ambitious plan called for the complete elimination of illicit Chapare coca by
the year 2002.1 24 Government officials then zealously declared that the "zero
coca" goal would be met by 2001.125 Plan Dignidad, which called for the
physical uprooting of the coca plant, was significantly more successful than the
previous measures. 126 The forced eradication resulted in an estimated 90%
decline in the production of coca.127
Considered highly controversial,
• . 128 the enforcement of the Plan was linked to
several human rights violations.
Coca unions organized themselves in
protests to block roads and harass police, occasionally incorporating lethal
violence. 129 In retaliation, government officials returned the use of deadly
force. 130 The Permanent Human Rights Assembly states that there have been 57
documented deaths of coca farmers at the hands of security forces since 1987.131
132
Only three of those have gone to court, and none of them have been resolved.
Reports of excessive force and killing unarmed civilians during confrontations
1 33
still remain uninvestigated.
While effective at reducing coca, Plan Dignidad failed to provide suitable
alternative crops for farmers. 134 Many farmers admitted that they were unable to
subsist on alternate crops, and either completely reverted back to planting coca,

recognizes the need for foreign aid not only to implement this law, but also to combat the
economic conditions perpetuating the coca and cocaine trade in Bolivia.") (footnote omitted).
120. Profile, supra note 13.

121. Ledebur, supra note 14.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Profile, supra note 13.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

131. Ledebur, supra note 14.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id.
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or at least used it to subsidize the failing alternate. 13 5 At one point, coca growers
"on the side of
piled up rotting bananas, pineapples, and other alternative 13crops
6
the road to protest the lack of markets for their licit goods."
137

B. Introduction of the ATPA
With the hope of finding a suitable alternative to coca that would still be
economically competitive, the United States implemented the Andean Trade
Preferences Act ("ATPA") in 1991. Under designation of the President,' 38 the
ATPA allows Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia "duty-free access to the
U.S. market for any product not specifically excluded."' 139 Despite its relation to
the Andean Region, Venezuela is not a recipient of the benefits. 140 The
Congressional report states that the objective of ATPA is "to promote broadbased economic development, diversify exports, consolidate democracy, and
defeat the scourge of drug trafficking, b , providing sustainable economic
In 2002, the ATPA was renewed
alternatives to drug-crop production ....
and expanded under the name of the Andean Trade Preferences and Drug
Eradication Act ("ATPDEA"), 142 and President Bush declared all four countries
eligible for benefits. 143 Legally, the President is under no obligation to extend
duty-free benefits to these countries. 144 But under the ATPA, the President is
given the authority to allow articles duty-free entry. 145 The ATPDEA was to
originally run only through Dec. 31, 2006.146 An extension recently agreed upon
in the U.S. Congress extended the benefits to June 30, 2007.147 As mentioned

135. Id.

136. Id.
137. For general purposes, the ATPA and ATPDEA are used somewhat interchangeably. When
the specific need for distinction between the two is required, the former will be most likely be
referred to as "the original ATPA" or something similar to distinguish it from the latter.
138. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1233, title II, sec. 202 (1991) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 3201 et seq.) [hereinafter ATPA].
139. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.

140. Common Foreign Policy, supra note 23.
141. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.
142. Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933, div. C, title XXXI, § 3101 [hereinafter ATPDEA];
Common Foreign Policy, supra note 23.
143. To Implement the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Proclamation No.
7616, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,283 (Oct. 31, 2002); SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 3-4.
144. ATPA, supra note 138, at § 202.
145. Id.

146. Common Foreign Policy, supra note 23.
147. ATPA Extension, supra note 10, § 7002(a).
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previously, the language of the bill allows for a possible six month extension
if a
14 8
trade agreement between the U.S. and the benefiting country is reached.
In addition to the ATPDEA, Bolivia receives benefits from the United
States Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). 149 The GSP, which as of
2002 was implemented by sixteen countries, 15 is based on the idea that
preferential tariffs allow for an increase in exports and contribute to economic
growth. 15 1 The ATPA falls into a narrow category of regional
52 programs within
preferences.1
additional
its
of
because
GSP
States'
the United
The GSP is also known for its principles of conditionality and
graduation. 153 All GSP schemes attach some form of either "positive" or
"negative" conditionality on preferences. 154 Positive conditionality grants
additional concessions to benefiting countries when they comply with the
prescribed criteria of agreement.' 55 For example, the European Communities'
GSP awards additional tariff reductions to countries that enact legislation to
protect fundamental labor rights. 156 In contrast, the more common approach of
negative conditionality withdraws concessions when countries are unable to
157
meet the set criteria.
The ATPA fits into the category of "negative"
58
1
conditionality.
Graduation,
the other aspect of the GSP, is governed by a country's status
,,
•
,,159
as 'developing.
For purposes of the GSP, the status of "developing" is
determined by the principle of self-election.160 Under the United States' GSP, a
country that reaches a certain level of development no longer receives
benefits. 16 1 This idea of "graduation" rests on the theory that a "developed"
148. Id. § 7002(b)(1)-(2).
149. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
150. Amy M. Mason, The Degeneralizationof the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP):
Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, 54 DuKE L.J. 513, 521 n.48 (2004) ("The sixteen

countries are Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the EC, Hungary, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey,

and United States.").
151. Id. at 514.

152. Id. at 522-23.
153. Id. at 515.
154. Id at 524.
155. Id.

156. Mason, supra note 150, at 524.
157. Id. at 524.
158. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 ("The President may withdraw or suspend
ATPA/ATPDEA designation, or withdraw, suspend or limit benefits, if a country's performance

under the eligibility criteria is no longer satisfactory.").
159. Mason, supra note 150, at 526.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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country no longer needs the help of preferential treatment to compete on the
world market.l6
Although Bolivia already receives benefits under the United States'
Generalized System of Privileges, the ATPDEA is a broader program. 163 As
well, under the ATPA/ATPDEA imports are "not subject to the GSP's
competitive need limitations or its country graduation requirements.' ' 164 The
ATPA also has "symbolic importance in that it is a165
tangible reflection of the U.S.
government's commitment to the Andean region."'
Under the ATPDEA, each participating country must meet certain criteria
to remain eligible for benefits. 1 6 Two types of conditions are present in the
ATPDEA: mandatory and discretionary. 167 If mandatory criteria are not met,
then the President may not designate the country as a beneficiary. 16 8 The only
exception is if the President finds that it would be in
the best
169 "economic or
....
security interest of the United States" to allow the designation.
The items on
the list of mandatory criteria cover such areas as the communist nature of the
country, whether the nationalization of companies has affected the United States
or its citizens, and the rights of workers in the country. 17
Regarding
discretionary criteria, the President must take it into account when designating
beneficiary
countries, but is not barred from doing so if the criteria are not met in
1
full.

17

Discretionary criteria deal with, among many items, the economic situation
of the country and its adherence to world trade standards. 172 Of particular
interest is the mention of the country's need to meet the "counternarcotics
certification criteria set forth in section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 .... 173 The applicable language from section 490 is:
[T]he President shall consider the extent to which the country has(A) met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
including action on such issues as illicit cultivation, production,
162. Id.
163. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
164. Id.
165. Guy C. Smith, The Andean Trade PreferenceAct, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 149 (1992).
166. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 11-12.

171. Id. at 11.
172. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 13.

173. Id. at 14.
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distribution, sale, transport and financing, and... (B) accomplished the
goals described in an applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the
United States or a multilateral agreement ....174
The ATPA/ATPDEA initially garnered strong support. 175 The incentive to
participate in legitimate agricultural activities was obvious, 17 6 but the United
States stood to benefit from the promotion of international labor standards, the
177
protection of intellectual property rights, the assistance in the War on Terror,
as well as the reduction of dependency on the coca leaf.
It is now reported that the effect of the ATPA/ATPDEA on the United
States economy is "negligible,"' 178 but some still believe it is far from
insignificant.17 9 While "negligible" perhaps to the United States, tens of
thousands of Bolivian jobs and several hundred million dollars in revenue are at
stake for Bolivia.180
C. ATPA versus ATPDEA
1. Expansion
The alteration between the ATPA and the ATPDEA effected a strong
change in the composition of United States' trade with the ATPA countries.
When the original ATPA was initiated in 1991, duty free treatment was provided
to articles that:
[are] the growth, product, or manufacture of a beneficiary if - (A) that
article is imported directly from a beneficiary country into the customs
territory of the United States; and (B) the sum of (i) the cost or value of

174. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 490(2)(A)-(B), 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
175. See generally Hale Sheppard, The Andean Trade Preference Act: Past Accomplishments
and Present Circumstances Warrant Its Immediate Renewal and Expansion, 34 GEO.WASH. INT'L

L. REV. 743 (2003) (highlighting the importance of the ATPA and the proven and potential
benefits that the United States would receive from its renewal and expansion before the initial
expiration date in 2001).
176. Smith, supra note 165, at 157.
177. See Sheppard, supra note 175.
178. News Release, U.S. International Trade Commission, ITC Finds Impact of ATPA Imports
Negligible, Despite Enhancements (Oct. 7, 2005), availableat
http://www.usitc.gov/ext-relations/newsrelease/2004/erlOO7bbl .htm.
179. Smith, supra note 165, at 158 ("Although perhaps narrow in scope, the ATPA is not
necessarily insignificant.").
180. Logan, supra note 8.
181. Joanne Guth, Implementation ofA TPDEA Changes Composition of Imports Under A TPA in
2003, INT'L ECON. REV., 19 (Nov./Dec. 2003).
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the materials produced in a beneficiary country or 2 or more
beneficiary countries under this Act, or a beneficiary country under the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act or 2 or more such countries,
plus (ii) the direct costs of processing operations performed in a
beneficiary country or countries (under this Act or the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act), is not less than 35 percent of the appraised
82
value of such article at the time it is entered.'
Following this criteria, some 5,600 articles were eligible to enter the United
States under the original ATPA, 183 with the largest product groups being copper
articles, flowers, and jewelry, which accounted for 59.5 percent of total ATPA
exports in 2000.184
With regard to Bolivia specifically, nearly 37 percent of its exports entered
the United States under the ATPA in 2001, although this only accounted for a
mere $55 million.185 The ATPA had a localized effect on Bolivia's economy.186
In fact, one analysis shows Bolivia experienced a 49 percent drop in ATPA
exports between 1996 and 2001.187 Although Bolivia enjoys comparative
advantages over other countries, it is also burdened with several obstacles in
exploiting the ATPA. 188 Job training, knowledge of the U.S. market, and other
benefits.1 89
difficulties hindered Bolivia from taking full advantage of the ATPA
gold were the only
During this period, exportation of wooden doors, sugar, and
190
considerably.
fell
jewelry
while
increase,
an
see
to
articles
192
With the advent of the ATPDEA in October 2002,191 an amended ATPA
expanded the list of eligible articles to include items previously excluded from
duty-free treatment.1 93 Several articles which were previously barred by section

182. ATPA, supra note 138, § 204.

183.

UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE

2004, at 1-5 (Sept. 2005), availableat
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3803.pdf [hereinafter ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT].
184. Id. at2-12.
ACT: ELEVENTH REPORT

185. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FIRST REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF THE
18 (Apr. 2003), available at
AS AMENDED
ANDEAN TRADE
PREFERENCE ACT

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Development/Preference-Programs/ATPA/asset-upload-file
.3782.pdf (hereinafter FIRST OPERATION REPORT).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 1.
192. Pub. L. 107-210, title XXXI, sec. 3103(a), Aug. 6, 2002.
193. 19 U.S.C. § 3203(b)(1); ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 1-5.
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195

204(b) of the ATPA 194 quickly usurped the leading export positions
and
nearly tripled the proportion of U.S. imports under the original ATPA. 196 Most
notable were the additions of certain textiles and apparel,
tuna not packaged in
cans,
and watch parts, as well as petroleum and petroleum
d ..watches
198
derivatives.
The additional articles of the ATPDEA, expanded by 700 items,
brought the total to 6,300 products available for duty-free access to the United
States. 199
Petroleum products quickly began to dominate the export list,
200
comprising 60 percent of the value of U.S. imports under the ATPDEA.
20 1
Newly admitted apparel items registered in 6 of the top 20 leading exports.
The new articles outlined by the ATPDEA had a significant effect on the
trade between the beneficiary countries and the United States. 2 02 By 2005, 12 of
the 20 leading imports were eligible under the new ATPDEA; the remaining 8
fell under the original ATPA. 2 03 Overall, trade between the U.S. and the four
countries grew at an accelerated rate. 2 04 Two-way trade increased 13 percent in
2003, 27 percent in 2004, 2 05 and another 25 percent in 2005. 206 From 1991 to
2005, U.S. imports from the ATPDEA region quadrupled and U.S. exports to the
four countries doubled. 2 07 U.S. imports from ATPDEA countries rose 21
percent in 2003, and continued a steady growth from $11.6 billion to $15.5
billion in 2004, 2 0 8 then almost another 30 percent to a record $20.1 billion in
2005 209--of which $11.5 billion entered under the ATPDEA. 2 10 In comparison,

194. ATPA, supra note 138.
195. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 2-12.
196. Guth, supra note 181, at 20.
197. 19 U.S.C. § 3203(b)(3)(13).
198. Id. § 3203(b)(1).
199. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 1-5.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Guth, supra note 181, at 20.
Id.
See id.

UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE
ACT: TWELFTH REPORT 2005, at 2-9 (Sept. 2006), available at
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3888.pdf [hereinafter TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT] ("The

ATPDEA group includes five petroleum products, of which two (heavy crude oil and light crude
oil) top the list, six apparel products.., and certain tuna products in airtight containers.").
204. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 2-1.
205. Id.
206. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 2-1.
207. Id.
208. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 2-1.
209. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 2-1.
210. Id. at 2-9.
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prior to the ATPDEA expansion, the largest single year increase from the2 region
11
was $8.36 billion to $9.83 billion in 1998-1999, an increase of 17 percent.
2 12
The ATPDEA rejuvenated the success that was waning under the ATPA.
With the help of the expanded list of eligible articles, the ATPDEA had a
significant impact on trade throughout the region. The continued growth of
industry under the ATPDEA provided an increase in the need for laborworkers that otherwise might have become involved in the illegal coca trade and
drug trafficking. 2 13 The success of the ATPDEA directly contributed to
controlling the drug trade in the region. 2 14 Conversely, without the jobs
provided by the ATPDEA-fueled industry, there is a greater chance that workers
will continue to grow illegal coca.
2. What has the ATPDEA done for Bolivia specifically?
For the entire region, the ATPDEA has had a significant impact, but a quick
look at the breakdown of the four beneficiary countries under the ATPDEA
reveals that Bolivia is far behind the others in its economic contribution. 2 15 In
2005, Columbia had a lead with 40 percent of total U.S. imports under the
ATPA, while Bolivia significantly trailed in fourth with 1.4 percent of the
total.2 16 It may seem that the ATPDEA is as insignificant to Bolivia as2 17Bolivia
is to the ATPDEA, but a look at the numbers is evidence to the contrary.
In 2004, imports under the ATPDEA from Bolivia amounted to $120
million. 2 18 This amount may seem negligible compared to other countries, such
as Peru's $1.6 billion, 2 19 until one realizes that the amount constitutes 46 percent
of all U.S. imports from Bolivia. 22 Peru's $1.6 billion is only 43 percent of
221
their total.
Percentage wise, the ATPDEA had a greater effect on Bolivia's
ability to import to the United States in 2004. In 2005, Bolivia continued
to
222
increase ATPDEA exports to the U.S., reaching the mark of $157.3 million.

211. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
212. Id. at 6-7.

213. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 4-3 ("[T]he opportunity for legal employment
in such instances has drawn workers away from illegal drug-crop production, processing, and
transportation, particularly laborers from impoverished regions.").
214. Id.
215. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at xiii ("Columbia accounted for 40.6 percent;

Ecuador for 38.1 percent; Peru for 19.9 percent; and Bolivia for 1.4 percent of the total.").
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 2-30.
219. Id. at 2-29.

220. Id. at 2-30.
221. Id. at 2-29.
222. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 2-24.
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The year 2004 ushered in Bolivia's best economic performance in five
22 3
years with a 3.5 percent increase in their gross domestic product ("GDP").
The growth was attributed primarily to an export boom, which also occurred in
each of the ATPA countries. 224 It is believed that the total value of export goods
from Bolivia increased 24 percent. 225 Bolivia's prime export under the ATPA is
percent of the total jewelry
gold jewelry. 22 6 In 2005, Bolivia provided 239
27
Peru.
to
only
second
ATPA,
the
under
imported
The U.S. Embassy in Bolivia believes the ATPA is an important incentive
to create jobs and increase exports. 228 Several large companies have taken full
advantage of the ATPA in the areas of textile, wood, leather, and gold
manufacturing. 22 9 The Embassy reports that exports in these areas alone
increased 15.6 percent in 2004. 230 Although Brazil receives the majority 23of1
Bolivia's total export revenue, the United States is the largest non-gas market.
The Embassy also states that the ATPA is of particular importance because of its
impact on job creation. 232 An increase of job creation
is of specific importance
233
considering Bolivia's 12 percent unemployment rate.
A significant number of jobs have been created because of the ATPA.
From 2000-2003, 38 new exporting companies were created---each exporting
under the ATPA. 234 In 2004 alone, 39 companies were created. 235 One gold

223.

ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 2-39.
224. Id. at 2-39.
225. Jose Miguel Insulza, Sec'y Gen. of the Org. of Am. States (OAS), Remarks at the
Conference of the Andean Dev. Corp., the Inter-Am. Dialogue and the OAS: Trade Investment in
the Americas (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.aspsCodigo=060161 ("Trade Figures are also promising. In 2005, the value of exports of goods from Latin
America grew by 20.3 percent. In the case of Bolivia, the increase was 24 percent; for Columbia
26 percent; Ecuador 25 percent; Peru 37 percent; and in the case of Venezuela: 43 percent.").
226. TWELFTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 2-18.

227. Id.
228. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 3-20.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 3-20.

235. Id. ("The number of companies exporting in the textile and apparel sector increased from
26 companies in 2003 to 36 in 2004, in wooden doors and window, from 21 to 31; in furniture and
other wood products, from 28 to 29; and in leather manufacturing, from 27 to 31.") (footnote
omitted).
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jewelry company in particular employs 750 workers and farms out 2,000 more
jobs to residents of El Alto, an impoverished city on the outskirts of La Paz. 236
For El Alto, a populous slum city,
the fact that the job pays more than three
238
times the minimum wage of Bolivia
is a rare find. This particular company
experienced a growth of nearly 50 percent in exports from 2004 to 2005. 233 In
addition to this company, El Alto is home to over 5,000
companies that benefit
24 housing an estimated 80,000 jobs. 24 1
ATPA,
the
from
Another example is the palm heart industry in the Chapare region, where
exports to the United States are expected to triple in 2006. 2 4 The fact that the
palm heart is an alternative crop to growing coca makes this an even more
244
significant market. 24 3 The palm heart industry employs some 3,000 families.
In addition to those families, workers at processing 4lants can also attribute the
creation of their jobs to the passage of the ATPA.
But beyond job creation,
this growth has allowed for improvement in quality and packaging, resulting in
higher economic returns and a diversification of the market for non-traditional
countries.246
247
Despite Bolivia's limited availability in the textile and apparel sector,
imports to the United States more than doubled during 2002-2004. 2 48 Sadly, the

236. Insulza, supra note 225.
237. Hal Weitzman, Held to Ransom in the Sporadic Siege of the Bolivian State, FIN. TIMES,

Sept. 12, 2006, available at http:/lsearch.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=FELIZ&id=060912000942
("El Alto... is a grimy, bustling commercial district of pot-holed roads, belching minibuses, street
vendors and packs of stray dogs. The air... smells of poverty: a mixture of unwashed clothes,
rotting vegetables and urine.").
238. Insulza, supra note 225.
239. Id.
240. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 3-21.
241. Sergio Munoz, A good bargain in the Andes, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, 2,

available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-opmunozi oct01,0, 15387.story?coll=la-sunday-commentary.
242. Insulza, supra note 225.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. ("Improvements in quality and packaging have yielded higher prices and the
diversification of markets to include not just traditional partners, such as Chile and Argentina, but
also France, Spain, Uruguay, and Israel.").
247. ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183, at 3-22 ("Bolivia's textile sector has access to
indigenous supplies of llama and alpaca hair but limited supplies of cotton, wool, and raw
materials needed to produce manmade fibers, thereby requiring Bolivia to import a substantial
portion of its textile inputs.").
248. Id. at 2-22, 2-18 Table 2-8.
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total of almost $40 million still only measured to 2.8 percent of textile imports
from ATPA countries for the United States. 249 Nevertheless, during that time
period, the textile industry was expected to create 40,000 jobs because of the
benefits provided by the expanded ATPA. 25
The ATPDEA has enticed
investments in Bolivia's textile and apparel industry specifically to take full
advantage of the ATPDEA benefits. 25 1 In 2005, Amatex, one of the largest
textile manufacturers in Bolivia, increased its exports to Ralph Lauren and
approved a new contract with Abercombie and Fitch. 252 Yet Amatek still
expresses concern about maintaining
competitiveness if trade benefits under the
253
continue.
not
do
ATPDEA
Understanding the position the ATPDEA plays in Bolivia's economy is
only part of the equation. Despite the huge impact it has had on the economic
development in Bolivia, the new president, Evo Morales, does not see the
relationship with the United States as might be expected. The next section will
examine Morales' history-shedding light on his perspective.
IV. Evo MORALES
A. From Peasantto President,the rise of Evo Morales
To understand why Bolivia might be opposed to a free trade agreement, it is
proper to understand the history of its dynamic new leader. On December 18,
2005, Evo Morales made history in an impressive victory, becoming Bolivia's
first indigenous president. 4 After several years of political turmoil, the stage
was set for Morales and the MAS party (Movimiento al Socialismo, or

U.S. textiles and apparel from ATPA countries, 2000-2004
Country

2000

Peru
Columbia
Bolivia
Ecuador
Total

405,650
443,766
19,172
23,087
891,675

2001
-------------------

383,783
376,326
18,372
24,704
803,185

2002

2003

2004

1,000 dollars----------------------------

395,314
369,531
18,718
15,855
799,418

516,134
538,925
34,277
18,070
1,107,406

691,554
636,349
39,524
19,929
1,387,356

Change,
2003-2004
Percent

34
18
15
10
25

249. Id. at 2-22.
250. Otto J. Reich, Assistant Sec'y of State, W. Hemisphere Affairs, Remarks to Fifth Annual

Andean Dev. Conference: New Challenges and Opportunities in Latin America (Sept. 6, 2002),
availableat http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/13362.htm.

251.
252.
253.
254.

TWELFrH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 203, at 3-21.

Id. at 3-22.
Id.
Brea, supra note 2.
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winning the presidency
Movement Toward Socialism) to take the polls by storm,
255
turnout.
voter
strong
and
majority
with an impressive
In 1959, Juan Evo Morales Aima was born in a small adobe house with a
straw roof, no more than three feet by four meters. 256 A young Aymara Indian,
he spent the days working the family farm. 257 Early in his life he learned the
importance of the coca leaf:
Every morning before going to work, my father did his adulation to the
Pachamama, which is Mother Earth; my mother also offered to Mother
Earth with alcohol and coca leaves so that things would go well for us
all day. It was as if my parents were talking with the land, with
2 58
nature.
only
Of his seven siblings,
I three survived the harsh environment of the
. 259
In addition to farm labor, Morales went to school
small community, Orinoca.
and was active in athletics. 260 In 1980, El Nifio destroyed nearly 70 percent of
In the
the farm production along with more than 50 percent of the animals.
the Morales family moved to the area around
wake of the 26devastation,
2
Cochabamba.
It was in that region where Morales witnessed the indignities thrust on the
coca farmers. 263 A particularly horrible event stood out in Morales' memory:
[A] coca farmer was savagely assassinated by the military of the Garcia
Meza government when they were drunk and beating him savagely
because he didn't want to declare himself guilty of drug trafficking; so,
without a second thought, they doused his whole body with gasoline
and, in front of several settlers, burned him alive. 26

255. Evo MoralesAima - Victory, www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfilEng-poder.aspx (last

visited Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Victory].
256. Childhood,supra note 3.
257. Id.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Evo Morales - Youth, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil-Eng-juven.aspx (last
visited Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Youth].
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Evo Morales - Coca Farmer,

http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil-Eng-cocal.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Coca Farmer].
264. Id.
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The trials suffered by the coca growers solidified in him the desire to "fight
tirelessly for the respect of human rights, for peace, for peace on [their] land,
[and] for the free cultivation of the coca leaf .... 265 It was also in Cochabamba
where he first
began his political career in the local coca growing union, San
26 6
Francisco.
From this position, Morales began his movement against the regulated coca
eradication, organizing protests and marches on the capital. 267 Consequently, he
spent time in prison, suffered beatings and torture, and survived assassination
269
attempts. 2 68 His struggles served only to inspire him and his followers.
Morales remembers, "On more than one occasion, especially when I was
imprisoned, I heard through my means of communication a phrase that came
270
from the heart of society: 'In the Chapare, there are thousands of Evos."'
Morales not only gained the attention of his fellow union members, but also of
other allies involved in a non-violent war on drugs. 27 1 For his efforts, Evo
Morales was nominated by a coalition of politicians and academics for the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1995 and 1996.272
In 2003, after violent outbursts in La Paz over proposed plans to export
natural gas via pipeline, former President Sanchez de Lozada resigned, leaving
the Presidency open for election. 273 In December, Morales became the first
Aymara president of Bolivia. 274 Morales stormed into office supported mainly
on the promises to regain control of the hydrocarbon industry and to end the
eradication of the coca leaf.2 75 Five days into his presidency he cut his own
salary by 57 percent, lowering it to $1,875 a month. He then declared that no
Cabinet member could collect a higher salary than his own. The salary cut
occurred because of insufficient funding for the necessary number of public
265. Id.
266. Evo Morales - Union Leader,

http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil-Eng__sindi.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Union Leader].
267. Id.
268. Id. ("In 1989, when Evo was paying homage to companions who had fallen in the defense
of the coca leaf, UMOPAR forces beat him savagely and dumped him in the bushes, thinking he
was dead.").
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.

272. Union Leader, supra note 266.
273. McCarthy, supra note 13 ("Troops using tear gas and bullets to break up the protest killed
at least 50 people in what became known as the 'war in defense of gas.' Disgraced, Sanchez de
Lozada resigned and fled to safety in the United States.").
274. Pablo Bachelet, Bolivia: Morales' U.N. Address Gives His People a Voice, MIAMi HERALD,

Sept. 26, 2006, at A l, available at http://www.americas.org/item_29622.
275. Victory, supra note 255.
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school teachers. 276 Morales had the money from
the reduced salaries channeled
277
to fund the placement of the needed teachers.
Despite an amicable start,
relationship with the United States has
•
•Morales'•278
been marred by various accusations against the U.S..
Morales has denounced
the idea of US-backed free trade and formed strong bonds with Cuba and
Venezuela. 2 79 Morales also announced the nationalization of Bolivia's natural
gas and petroleum resources,
at• his, inaugural
speech that he "would
•
, claiming
•,
•,,280
end centuries of 'foreign plunder' of Bolivia's mineral wealth.
This was a
fairly significant event
considering Bolivia ranks second in natural gas reserves
2 81
in South America.
Morales made his first appearance at the United Nations in September
2006. 2 82 During his address to the members, and while "raising his index finger
as if to underscore a point, he said: 'I have arrived to repair the historic damage,
the damage caused over 500 years. '283 He then presented to the assembly, "as
if it were a small trophy," a small coca leaf. 284 After explaining
what it was he
285
then pointed out, "It is green. It is not white like cocaine."
B. Controversy
1. Heated Rhetoric
Understanding Morales' road to the presidency, as well as his ties to the
coca leaf may explain the harsh feelings he has towards the United States. Even
from his days as a union leader in the Tropics of Cochabamba, Evo Morales has

276. Victor Caivano, Bolivian President Slashes Salary for Public Schools, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 2006, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-01-28-morales-salary-x.htm.

277. Id. ("'We need 6,000 new teachers and there is only money for 2,200.' ... The yearly
savings of more than $31,340 on the president's income.., is about enough in Bolivia to rent an
upper-middle class apartment, buy one new Ford Focus or pay the annual salaries of 10 veteran
teachers.").
278. Weitzman, supra note 11; Carlos Valdez, Bolivia Leader Claims AssassinationAttempt, AP

ONLINE, May 31, 2006, available at https://www.americas.org/item_.27640 ( "'I've been informed
recently how the U.S. had organized teams - groups to persecute Evo Morales, to kill Evo
Morales. They haven't been able to and now we're organized, from unions to this political party
and they can't stop us anymore,' Morales said, without giving more details.").
279. See Frank Bajak & Fiona Smith, Indian, Others Voice Doubts About Where Bolivia is
Going/As Morales Attempts to Remake His Nation, Chavez Casts Shadow, HOUSTON CHRON., July

1, 2006, at A31; Snow, supra note 25.
280. McCarthy, supra note 13.
281. Profile, supra note 13.
282. Bachelet, supra note 274.
283. Id.

284. Id.
285. Id.
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been fighting against the United States' drug policies 286 and seems to thrive off
contentious language aimed at the United States. 287 While Bolivia was under
pressure from the U.S. to eradicate the coca, Morales was firmly planted in its
defense. 2 88 Morales has said, "I believe that my only full time occupation, one
hundred percent, my true passion.., is, the defense of the coca leaf .... "289
Because of these stark differences in attitudes towards coca, Morales' passion
put him at odds with the United
States very early on, but made him a hero among
• .290
the coca growing communities.
Bolivians,
•
291 disgruntled over U.S. drug policies, elected Morales to the
presidency.
During his campaign, he relied heavily on anti-American rhetoric
to win suport, rejecting the neo-liberal policies of the former Bolivian
presidents. 29 Showing his opposition to the American Imperialism, Morales
promised to legalize coca cultivation throughout Bolivia. 293 Since his entrance
to the presidency, he has said that he will cease the
acceptance of support for
294
counter-narcotic activities that rely on U.S. funding.
Morales has often criticized the United States, calling capitalism "the worst
enemy of humanity. ' 295 In reference to the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
Morales
it is "an agreement to legalize the colonialization of the
m• believes
,,296
Americas.
Morales has even gone so far as to call George W. Bush a
terrorist. 29 7 In addition to the troubles Morales has with the United States, one
reporter has noted •that,
seems
to genuinely enjoy inciting conflict and
- , "he
•
,,298
ignoring international relations.
The trouble began long before Morales was elected president, but
it299seemed
•
that for a moment relations between the two countries might improve.
That
thought quickly disappeared when two of Morales' cabinet members were

286. Union Leader,supra note 266.
287. Weitzman, supra note 11.

288. Id.
289. Union Leader,supra note 266.

290. Brea, supra note 2.
291. Tierney, supra note 1.
292. Id.
293. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16, at 12.

294. Id. at 13.
295. Brea, supra note 2.
296. Id.
297. Guillermo I. Martinez, Bridges Built and Burned, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2006, at
21A.
298. Armstrong Williams, Bolivia, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, May 11, 2006.
299. Weitzman, supra note 11.
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denied U.S. visas. 30 Morales claimed that the decision to reject the visas was an
"open provocation." ' 30 1 He furthered the criticism by saying that to obtain a U.S.
visa "you have to be corrupt, a murderer," in reference to former President
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada who sought asylum in the United States after a
violent uprising forced him to leave Bolivia in 2003. 302 Despite statements from
the U.S. Embassy in La Paz that one visa was rejected because30 3of a technical
error, it opened the door for continued accusations from Morales.
In May 2006, Morales claimed that the U.S. government was organizing
groups to kill him. 304 The U.S. Embassy responded by saying the charges were
"baseless. '' 30 5 Morales also claimed that certain foreign energy companies were
plotting against him, and that the U.S. was trying to overthrow him. 306 These
claims were also unsupported by any proof.30 7 In June 2006, he claimed that the
United States was sending soldiers in to Bolivia disguised as students and
tourists 30 8 and accused the CIA of secretly training agents in Santa
Cruz. 3 0 9 The
310
Embassy.
U.S.
the
by
unfounded accusations were sharply denied
In September 2006, Morales made his first presidential visit to the United
States, although he did not spend any time Washington. 3 11 The highlight of his
trip was a speech at the United Nations where he continued his criticism of U.S.
3 12
policies, saying that neoliberalism "continued to 'pillage natural resources."'
Confronted with the idea that the ATPA and other U.S. aid might be suspended
because of Bolivia's lackluster effort in eradicating coca cultivation, Morales
3 13
referred to the policies as "blackmail" and an attempt at "re-colonization."

300. Pablo Bachelet, Bolivia: Visa, Drug Disputes Could Undo U.S. Diplomacy, MIAMI HERALD,

Apr. 28, 2006, at 10A.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Valdez, supra note 278.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Bolivia: U.S. Denies Sending Soldiers to Bolivia, MIAMi HERALD, June 23, 2006, at A13
[hereinafter U.S. denies].
309. Weitzman, supra note 11.
310. U.S. denies, supra note 308.
311. See Bachelet, supra note 274 ("Morales' first stop was Atlanta, where he chatted with
former Pres. Jimmy Carter and harvested peanuts at his farm. His first event in New York on

Tuesday was a meeting with five Native American nations and one from the Phillippines ....He
discussed trade and development matters with former Pres. Bill Clinton and invited him to visit
Bolivia.").
312. Id.
313. Id.
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When asked about a possible meeting with President Bush, Morales
responded by saying "Though I have not requested a meeting (with Bush), I
would do so with pleasure ....I would like to tell him some truths about human
rights, about social problems, about economic
problems, to tell him that
3 14
rebellion."
creates
only
sometimes aggression
Although Morales understands the United States' desire to reduce cocaine,
he has made it a point to distinguish coca from the equation. 3 15 From his own
personal experience he understands that the coca leaf is deeply rooted in the
social fabric of his people. 3 16 Hoping to clarify the distinction, he has begun
calling this new approach, "zero cocaine, but not zero coca.' 317 Morales insists
that "Coca is not cocaine ....The producer of coca leaf is not a drug trafficker
and the consumer is not an addict, this must be clear." 3 18 Despite his efforts, the
United States Congress is unlikely to support
319 any serious drug plan if it does not
contain some
sort
of
coca
eradication
plan.
Morales'
devotion to the coca leaf
•
•
•
320
..
is fundamental to his presidency.
Understanding his ties to coca and his
contempt for the United States makes it difficult to reconcile
his any efforts he
32 1
agreement.
trade
of
sort
any
form
to
making
is
and
made
2. Attempts to Secure an Extension
Despite his adamant denunciation of the United States and all its evils,
Morales made a very concerted effort to acquire an extension to the ATPDEA.
In a letter sent to President George W. Bush, in conjunction with the other
322
presidents of ATPDEA countries, Morales requested an extension of the Act.
The letter explained that the proposed extension would allow the countries to
continue to advance national development and preserve the well being of
workers and businesses that depend on the duty free exports. 323 The letter
reasoned that the extension of preferences would be necessary while other trade
agreements to which Bolivia and others aspire are worked out.324 The countries

314. Around the World, HOUSTON CHmON., Sept. 12, 2006, at A9.
315. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 16, at 13.
316. See id.
317. Id.

318. Ballv6, supra note 56.
319. Bachelet, supra note 300.
320. Logan, supra note 8.
321. See Martinez, supra note 297.
322. Letter from the Andean Community Presidents to the President of the United States, George
Bush, regarding the ATPDEA tariff preferences (June 13, 2006), available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/cartabush2006.htm
(last visited
May 1, 2007).
323. Id.

324. Id.
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also reinforced their commitment to the fight against drug trafficking,
recognizing that this was the initial reason for the trade agreement in the first
place. 325 Ultimately,
the goal of the letter was a plea to not disrupt trade with the
6
United States.

32

On a recent visit to the United States, Morales' Vice President, Alvaro
Garcia Lineras, was given a specific mission: downplay Morales' recent
decriminalization of the cultivation of coca and the slew of negative comments
made in regard to free trade agreements. 327 More specifically, his task was to
convince the United States to extend the ATPDEA. 32 Garcia Lineras, although
an intellectual product of Bolivia's elite, is nevertheless sympathetic to the
indigenous struggle. 329 In 1992, he aligned himself with mining and indigenous
movements, eventually organizing a peasant revolt. For his efforts, Garcia
Lineras was tortured and imprisoned, yet he managed to read 700 books during
his five years in captivity.
Garcia Lineras presents an interesting foil to
Morales and was hoped to be the ideal candidate to bring the message of peace
to the United States. 33 With his delegation to the United States, Garcia Lineras
was to lobby Congress to renew the trade agreement with the message that the
Bolivian government was fully committed to democracy and to the fight against
drug trafficking, and that foreign investors should not
fear, despite the recent
332
industry's.
gas
and
oil
country's
the
of
nationalization
United States'
officials complained that
333 Bolivia was failing to comply with
• •
specific requirements under
the
ATPDEA,
declaring that
•334disturbing trends are
•
•,
apparent in the country's dealings with efforts to combat illegal drugs.
White
House press secretary Tony Snow explained that Bolivia has initiated policies
that allowed
coca cultivation to expand and have decreased eradication
5
efforts.

33

Garcia Lineras countered the accusations by stating
that Bolivia is
336
implementing measures to ensure continued eradication.
In an effort to show

325. Id.
326. See id. This comment posits that it is difficult to reconcile Morales' overt disdain for the
United States while he continues to request support.
327. Martinez, supra note 297.
328. Id.
329. Pablo Bachelet, Bolivian VP visits U.S. in search of renewed ties, MIAMI HERALD, July 24,
2006, at A10.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Jennifer Loven, U.S. faults Bolivia Anti-Drug Efforts, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2006.

335. Id.
336. Bachelet, supra note 329.
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the United States that Bolivia is willing to comply with the set requirements of
narcotics control, Garcia Lineras claimed that the government is boosting antidrug efforts. 3 37 The Vice President explained that the new strategy intensifies
efforts regarding prohibition and increases measures to prevent acids and
components used in the preparation of cocaine from entering at the border, while
also increasing police raids. 338 Garcia Lineras reminded the United States that
Bolivia eradicates 25 to 27 hectares a day, an increase from 5 hectares a day in
early 2006.3 39 He believes that Bolivia will eradicate 5,200 hectares by the end
of the year, 340 accomplishing the commitment to the United States of 5,000
hectares. 34 1 Although the number may seem small, the elimination is done by
individual coca farmers. 34 2 "This represents a method of sustainable
' 34 3 selferadication that other countries in the Andean region have not achieved."
In addition to eradication, 2,000 cocaine processing labs were uncovered in
the first six months of 2006. 344 Comparing this to the 2,575 uncovered in the
entire year of 2005 might cause one to believe that there are more cocaine labs
and that cocaine production is on the rise, but the understanding that interdiction
345
efforts have increased because of the return of a stable Bolivian presidency.
Assuming that the majority of the labs were in place before Morales' took office,
the high numbers show a significant increase in the uncovering of cocaine labs
as opposed to previous years. 346 It should also be noted that Morales'
administration has had relatively little time in proving the value of its eradication
efforts compared to the previous years of failed policies of forced eradication by
former presidents. 34 7 Despite what the United States asserts, Garcia Lineras
believes the statistics
show that Bolivia is waging an effective battle in the war
34 8
on cocaine.

Vice President Garcia Lineras believed that Washington should at least
extend the ATPDEA for one more year. 349 Bolivia convened an assembly to
rewrite its constitution in August 2006, with the intent to "refound" the nation on

337. Adrian Garcia, Bolivia 'boosting' anti-drug efforts, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 13, 2006.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.

341. Logan, supra note 8.
342. Id.
343. Id.; see also Bachelet, supra note 300.

344. Logan, supra note 8.
345. Id.

346. Id.
347. Id.

348. Garcia, supra note 337.
349. Bachelet, supra note 329.
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pro-indigenous terms. 3 50 Garcia Lineras believes that a bridge of one or two
years is necessary before negotiating a new trade agreement because the
Constituent assembly may change the method regarding the negotiation and
implementation of trade agreements. 3 5 1 After the assembly has finished its
revision of the constitution,
both countries could begin discussing long-term
35 2
trade agreements.
In addition to the rigorous campaign by his Vice President, Morales named
353
Gustavo Guzman as the new Bolivian Ambassador to the United States.
Bearing a strategy to form a historic relationship, the ambassador has a threepoint mission: 1) renewal of the ATPDEA, 2) extradition of former president
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, and 3) eradication of the coca leaf. 354 Guzman
believes the United States has finally understood that President Morales is the
355
only one capable of resolving the coca and narco-trafficking problem.
Relying on Vice President Garcia Lineras' trip to the United States, Guzman
believes the6 door has been opened to establishing a long term trade
35
agreement.
3. Burning Bridges?
The outward manifestations of the Bolivian administration may not be
enough to acquire an extension of the ATPDEA when faced with the opposition
of Evo Morales' inflammatory rhetoric. 3 57 His barrage of ill-will may be the last
straw. 358 Regarding the U.S. policy of drug certification requirements, Morales
tagged it as blackmail. 359 He has maintained the stream of negative 3comments
61
36
toward the United States and holds President Bush out as a terrorist.
350. See Bolivia: President Evo Morales Wins Majority For Constitution Assembly, But Misses
Two - Thirds Mark, NORTISUR - S. AM. POL. & ECON. AFFAIRs, Aug. 4, 2006, available at

http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-17418217_ITM.
351. Juan Antonio Montecino, Talk at the Centerfor Strategic and InternationalStudies, July

21, 2006, availableat http://www.seen.org/PDFs/GarciaLinares-CSIS.pdf.
352. Bachelet, supra note 329.
353. Bolivia Appoints a

new Ambassador to

the United States, Quest

for

Peace,

http://quest.quixote.org/node/366 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
354. Id.
355. Id.

356. Id. The author of this comment argues that the diplomatic efforts of the Bolivian leadership
are evidence that Bolivia recognizes the need for the ATPDEA. The official letter requesting an
extension, the special envoy of the Vice President, and the main goals of the Ambassador all
suggest that Bolivia believes the ATPDEA to be a necessary element of the economy.
357. Martinez, supra note 297.
358. Id.

359. Id.
360. See, e.g., Bachelet, supra note 274.
361. Martinez, supra note 297.
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One journalist believes that the efforts of Vice President Garcia Lineras in
achieving an extension of the ATPDEA have been undermined by the actions
and comments of President Evo Morales. 362 Whatever relationships that were
established by the Vice President were quickly undone by Morales, leaving a
poor impression on Washington officials.
Garcia Lineras' trip may have been
for not because "[i]t is difficult to improve relations with a government that
sends an envoy
to build bridges and then have them blown up by his
' 364
"
president.
B. Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba
1. Intertwining
In addition to his critical rhetoric regarding the U.S., Morales has forged
strong alliances with two of the most prominent antagonists of the United
States-Venezuela and Cuba. 365 By maintaining relations with these countries,
Morales distances himself from the United States.
It may be possible that
Morales is merely searching out alternative markets in case the ATPDEA is not
extended, 367 but since the alliances have been made, the U.S. presence in
Bolivia has begun to shrink. 3 68 Evidence of the deepening partnership can be
seen in the various agreements signed between
the countries 3 69 and the
370
Bolivia.
toward
directed
aid
of
continuing flow
The signing of the Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos ("TCP") (People's
Trade Treaty) reinforced the ties formed between Bolivia, Cuba, and
Venezuela. 37 Signed in Havana on April 29, 2006, the treaty is a free trade
agreement between the three countries allowing for Bolivian products to be sold

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Juan Forrero, U.S. Aid Can't Win Bolivia's Love as New Suitors Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2006, at 14, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/world/americas/14bolivia.html?ex=1 305259200&en=e2fc 1d
7a22df532f&ei=5088&partner=-rssnyt&emc=rss.
366. See id.
367. Carlos Malamud, Venezuela's Withdrawalfrom the CAN (Andean Community of Nations)
and the Consequences for Regional Integration (Part 111):The Nationalisation of Bolivian

Hydrocarbons, REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, Aug. 29, 2006, at 2, available
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/1029/1029_MalamudVenezuelaCAN.pdf.

at

368. Bolivian Opposition Raises doubts over military accord with Venezuela, INT'L HERALD

TRIBUNE, Sept. 28, 2006 [hereinafter Bolivian Opposition].
369. Malamud, supra note 367, at 2.
370. Forrero, supra note 365.
371. Malamud, supra note 367, at 2.
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with zero tariffs to the other two countries. 372 Additionally, cooperation clauses
at subsidized prices and for Cuban doctors
call for Venezuelan fuel to be sold
373
and teachers to be sent to Bolivia.
Bolivia also signed onto the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
("ALBA") with Cuba and Venezuela. 374 The ALBA pact promises a socialist
version of commerce cooperation in the region while rejecting American-backed
free trade, and criticizes the United States' efforts to expand free trade in Latin
of the
America. 37 5 The three presidents called the stalled Free Trade Area
377
37 6 an attempt to annex the rest of Latin America.
Americas ("FFAA")
In addition to the official trade agreements, Venezuela and Cuba have made
their presence known in other ways. On a recent trip to Bolivia, Venezuelan
president Hugo Chavez was met with a hero's welcome after pledging $1.5
billion in energy investments in Bolivia. 37 8 The crowd shouted "Viva
Venezuela!" as Chavez addressed them with an anti-U.S. message.379
Venezuela has promised to aid Bolivia in the nationalization of its energy
industry; other countries have also provided aid, including Cuba which has
provided funds for rural clinics and literacy classes. 38 Venezuela also provides
additional aid which funds for scholarships to train health workers, programs by
which thousands of Bolivians obtain identification papers, and for the building
of 109 rural radio stations. 38 1 More than 1,000 Cuban doctors have made their
way to Bolivia to aid the rural population. 3 82 Chavez has also announced an
investment3 of $500,000 to finance a new coca leaf industrialization plant in
38
Bolivia.

372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Snow, supra note 25.
375. Id.
376. Id. ("The U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas hemispheric trade pact stalled last
year, but Washington since has signed nine free trade agreements with Latin American
countries.").
377. Id.
378. Chavez pledges $1.5 billion to Bolivia, HOUSTON CHRON., May 27, 2006, at A34
[hereinafter Chavez Pledges].
379. Id.
380. Forrero, supra note 365.
381. Id.
382. Bajak, supra note 279.
383. Bolivia: Chavez finances coca leaves industrializationplant in Cochabamba,EL CRONISTA,
Oct. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Chavez Finances].
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Venezuela's influence is also physically manifest in the presence of military
and petroleum workers. 3 84 The conspicuous technicians from Petroleos 385
de
Venezuela oil company ("PDVSA") move about openly in their red uniforms,
and a significant-but unknown-number of Venezuelan military are already
serving in Bolivia. 386 The military alliance has also planned to set up 20 new
military bases along the borders of Bolivia, raising concerns with Bolivia's
3 87
neighbors.
Despite receiving significant aid from the United States, the presence of
Venezuela and Cuba is often more apparent and welcomed. 38 8 The United
States pours over $100 million into Bolivia each year, building roads, clinics,
and helping small businesses. Yet, despite their efforts, the people recognize the
efforts of Venezuela and Cuba while rejecting that of the United States. 3 89 The
problem for the United States may be that many Bolivians associate aid from the
U.S. almost exclusively with the coca eradication and anti-drug policies that
have been the root of so many problems over the years. 39 For all of the good
that the United States does to develop infrastructure and encouraging
international lenders to forgive Bolivian debt, many Bolivians are ignorant to the
fact the aid comes from the United States. 39 1 Since 1985, the United States has
provided nearly $1 billion in aid to Bolivia, yet $100 million of U.S. aid annually
is unknown to the people or seen only as self-serving. 392 Whereas aid from
Venezuela and Cuba is openly promoted as such and the public knows its
origin. 393 Cuban and Venezuelan aid is lauded while United States' aid is taken
394
for granted.
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In the eyes
to change Bolivia,, a partnership
with Cuba and
•• of Morales,
395
• •
• ,,396
Venezuela is essential.
As opposed to the "socialist axis,
which it has
been labeled, Morales believes the three countries form an "axis of o8 "
With Venezuela and Cuba, Morales believes Bolivia can find solidarity.
Morales' actions, which have brought him closer to Chavez and Castro,
distance him diplomatically from the United States. 399 Relations between
Bolivia and the U.S. have been mired in suspicion and cooperation is
diminishing. 40 Instead of taking steps to create a productive relationship with
the United States, Morales has embraced the anti-American attitude of Castro
and Chavez. 40 1 Because Morales has aligned himself with the anti-American
proponents and has openly criticized the United States, the United States may
have little reason to extend trade benefits in his favor.
2. Bolivia is Cuba
Even though Morales has made many political moves contrary to the
United States, it would be premature to label him as a threat, and doing so might
undermine long-term democratic values that the United States desires to
retain. 402 The present situation in Bolivia can be compared with a similar
situation between the United States and Cuba in 1959.403 When dealing with
Castro, the United States' failure to react properly resulted in years of
confrontation and a near nuclear catastrophe.
Using a more pragmatic
approach with Bolivia, the United States may avoid similar consequences.
After the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the United States recognized Castro as40 a6
charismatic, influential leader and quickly responded to the new government.
Tension arose when Castro tried to consolidate power for himself and began to
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401. Williams, supra note 298.
402. Responding to Bolivian Democracy, supra note 4, at 27.
403. See id.
404. Id. at 28.
405. Id. at 30.
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defy the United States. 40 7 The economic sanctions that followed only made
Castro more obstinate toward
the United States, leaving him susceptible to the
40 8
Soviet Union's influence.
United States policy makers failed to recognize Castro's actions targeted
4 9
legitimate concerns regarding Cuba's economic and political sovereignty. 0
Another important aspect overlooked was Cuba's complete dependency on aid
from a third party sponsor to maintain stability and survival. 4 10 When the United
States cut its sugar quota, a vital aspect of Cuban economy was lost-giving
Castro a reason to break with the United States. 41 Short-sighted and severe
policies toward Cuba pushed Castro into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union as
a means of mere survival. 4 12 The United States failed to value Castro's
4 13
nationalist and humanist goals, and instead implemented policies of isolation.
As a result, Castro's agenda hampered the growth of Cuban economy and
4 14
democracy, and stalled American-Cuban relations.
The United States should consider the consequences of early Cuban
relations while approaching the present situation in Bolivia.4 15 "Bolivia is for
Venezuela what Cuba was for the Soviet Union-a strategic place to showcase
its influence and counter U.S. goals. ' 4 16 The lessons learned from Castro's
Cuba are applicable to Morales' Bolivia. 4 17 First, Morales is at a time where
influence is critical4 18 because he is still defining his idealistic policies, just as
Castro was in 1959. Second, Morales' position against the United States is
unsustainable without third party assistance, as was Cuba without the Soviet
Union. 4 19 This is why the relationship with Venezuela and Cuba is deserving of
abject poverty welcome the
such attention. 42 The Bolivian citizens living in
421
aid.
economic
Cuban
and
Venezuelan
of
presence
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3. Lessons Learned
Instead of pulling away and adopting inflexible economic policies against
Bolivia-as was done with Cuba-the United States should not overreact to
Morales' anti-American rhetoric and approach the situation with a measured and
constructive response. 422 A pragmatic approach would be to increase economic
assistance-as opposed to decreasing it-displacing Venezuela and assume the
role of Bolivia's third party sponsor. 423 For this to be effective, the aid must be
severed from
the strong conditionality of coca leaf eradication or other
42 4
stipulations.

Bolivia's battle for economic development can be hindered or helped by the
United States' support, but various forms of aid and trade agreements cannot be
contingent on strict U.S. policies. 425 Certain aspects of Morales socialistic
approach must be appreciated. 42 6 Many Bolivians opposed the neoliberal
policies of the former Bolivian presidents who were aligned with the United
States, fueling popular rebellion against these the governments of these former
leaders. 427 Morales was elected in what may have been the country's fairest
42 8
elections because of his promise to steer the country away from neoliberalism.
If Morales were to succumb to the strict policies of the United States it might
hinder the democratic development and stability of the new government. 42 9 The
United States needs to remain flexible in its granting of aid instead of taking it
430
away.
The United States' emphasis on the eradication of the coca leaf has been
extremely strict.4 3 1 A continued obsession with the coca leaf may only increase
the gap between Bolivia and the United States. 43 2 As was the case with
economic sanctions against Cuba,
in Bolivia is inflexible and has
• drug
• policy
433
been the source of much social conflict.
Instead of urging eradication, the
United States should consider alternative uses of the coca leaf.
At his visit to the United Nations, Evo Morales pleaded with the General
assembly to see coca's future as the ingredient for a lucrative consumer-goods
422.
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industry.4 35 Many products made from coca could perform well on the
international market if given clearance to export. 436 Companies are developing a
range of products-from toothpaste to wine to bread and pastas-to introduce to
the market.4 3 7 Morales has set aside $1 million to further develop products for
this purpose. 438 The economics of a legal coca market are now sensible. 4 39 The
general manager of one of Bolivia's largest companies, who purchases 13 metric
tons of coca annually, reports paling $6 a kilo to coca growers, where as cocaine
traffickers usually only pay $5. 0 This company produces coca tea, a product
Most importantly,
that stands to do considerably well on the world market.
the
price
of
licit
Bolivian coca
bringing coca into the legal market would cause
44 2
to increase, forcing drug traffickers elsewhere.
The key is to constructively engage and compromise with Morales if
socioeconomic change is to be encouraged. 443 The United States' primary
concern with coca is its link to drug trafficking, while Bolivian coca growers
only seek economic stability. 4 " Therefore, a legal export of coca on the world
promote economic
market would provide a viable livelihood for farmers and
445
problem.
trafficking
drug
the
addressing
still
while
growth
V. THE SITUATION AT HAND

A. Without the ATPDEA
The expiration of the ATPDEA will affect Bolivia on two levels: 1)
economically, and 2) with regard to coca production and drug trafficking.
Economic repercussions from an expired ATPDEA can be seen by examining
the eight months after the original ATPA expired. In 2002, United States
imports from ATPA countries changed significantly during December 4, 2001
until August 6, 2002, when the benefits were renewed. 446 In the preceding years
of 2000 and 2001, U.S. imports from the benefiting countries entering under the

435. Jimmy Langman, The Real Thing: Coca, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Oct. 2, 2006, available at
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ATPA were at nearly 18 percent. 447 With the expiration of the ATPA however,
imports entering under the ATPA were cut nearly in half-falling to 10.4
percent. From Bolivia specifically, U.S. imports entering under the ATPA fell
31 percent, from $54 million in 2001 to $37 million in 2002. 448 The leading
Bolivian ATPA export, jewelry and parts, decreased from $40 million in 2001 to
$27 million in 2002, a decline of 33 percent. 44 9 The decline of U.S. imports was
directly caused by the ATPA's expiration. 45 Similar results can be expected
with the expiration of the ATPDEA.
Although economic growth is a concern of the ATPDEA, its role in
controlling narco-trafficking is also vital. 4 51 Indeed, it has been referred to "as
the 'cornerstone' of U.S. efforts to cease the production of illegal drugs ...in
the Andean region."' 4 52 In 2001, it was stated that "renewal of a robust ATPA is
perhaps the most important contribution that [the United States] can make to
economic growth and prosperity in the Andes" because of the economic
alternatives to drug trafficking it provides. 453The same holds true today. The
ATPDEA has helped encourage the diversification of exports and as such, has
454
provided a viable economic alternative to drug production and trafficking.
Interruption of the ATPDEA at this point would cause serious repercussions
extending beyond the economic sphere. 455 Unemployment has been known to
provide available manpower for illegal drug trafficking. 45 6 The loss of jobs from
leave a large labor force susceptible to the
an expired ATPDEA would
4 57
temptation of the coca fields.
If the ATPDEA is not renewed, the effect on Bolivia could be
devastating. 4 58 The ATPA means more than just jobs for Bolivia; it is a way to
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http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4155/is_20060826/ain 16698892.
458. See Insulza, supra note 225.

414

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 14:2

• 459

prosperity.
The ATPA has had an "appreciable impact" on the Bolivian
economy;
an increase in the number of jobs and exports are a testament to
this. 46 1 To maintain economic growth, Bolivia depends on benefits granted by
the ATPDEA. The volume of jobs created by the presence of the ATPDEA is a
testament to its crucial role in the economy. The fact that those jobs are in
jeopardy because of its expiration manifest the very necessity of the act's
extension. Recognizing its need to secure a viable alternative market, Morales
has made deals with both Cuba and Venezuela. Although the countries are more
than willing to accommodate Morales, the substitute market will not be able to
support the Bolivian economy as well as the United States. 462 As much as
Morales desires to distance Bolivia from the United States, doing so might send
his country deeper into poverty. For now, Bolivia should continue its efforts to
secure an extension to the ATPDEA by forging a sufficient trade agreement.
B. Preventingthe Erosion of Democracy
Although the ATPDEA has had little impact on the United States' economy
and the eradication of coca, the United States would be wise to extend the tariff
benefits to Bolivia. Drawing upon lessons learned from early American-Cuban
policy, an extension of the trade agreement would aid Bolivia in maintaining
democracy and encouraging economic development-if done correctly. 463 The
United States
needs to loosen its hold on the coca leaf, for economic and cultural
464
reasons.
Bolivia needs the chance to explore economic systems without
excessive interference from the United States. The coca leaf plays such a
significant role in Bolivian culture that laws demanding its destruction cause a
rift between the people and the government.4 6 5 If given the opportunity, the
coca leaf could prove to be a valuable asset on the world market.
Coca cultivation finally began to decrease while the economy continued to
grow. To maintain this trend it is imperative that the international community
continue to assist Bolivia to continue achieving sustainable, legal livelihoods., 7
The ATPDEA is a proven means of encouraging economic development. If the
United States can reduce its emphasis on coca eradication and allow it a place in
459. Reich, supra note 250.
460. Andean Trade Program, supra note 20.
461. See ELEVENTH IMPACT REPORT, supra note 183.

462. Snow, supra note 25 ("Bolivia shipped just $5,291 in goods to Cuba last year, making Cuba
the 88th-largest Bolivian export market... Venezuela is Bolivia's fifth-largest market, accounting
for $167 million of Bolivia's $2.7 billion in exports."); see Malamud, supra note 367, at 2.
463. See Responding to Bolivian Democracy, supra note 3.
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the market then Bolivia will treat the drug problem at its source while
maintaining healthy relations with the' 469
United States. 46 8 After all, "the goal is to
farmers."
the
not
starve the traffickers,
VI. CONCLUSION

With the expiration of the ATPDEA, Bolivia stands to suffer a substantial
blow to their economy, and also possibly to democracy. Without the benefits
from the ATPDEA, many unemployed laborers may turn to the coca fields and
illegal drug trade. Despite critical rhetoric from President Evo Morales and
strong alliances with Venezuela and Cuba, the United States should forge a trade
agreement extending the benefits of the ATPDEA, while reducing its emphasis
on coca eradication. Doing so will continue economic development in Bolivia,
aid in stabilizing democracy, and provide an alternative to entering the drug
trade.
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469. UNODC 2006, supra note 26, at 1.

